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We try to explain why economic conflicts and illegal business often 
take place in poor countries. We use the concept of subsistence level of 
consumption (d) and assume a regular concave utility function for 
consumption levels higher than d. For consumption levels lower than d 
utility is constant and equal to zero. Under this framework poor agents 
are risk-lovers. This result helps to explain why economic conflicts are 
more likely to appear in poor economies and why poor agents are more 
willing to undertake illegal business. 
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Many times risky activities are undertaken by poor people. In particular, economic conflicts 
and illegal business often take place in poor countries. We suggest an explanation for these 
facts based on the characteristics of the utility function. In particular, we consider a utility 
function such that when the consumption lies below a subsistence level the utility is zero and 
when the consumption lies above the subsistence level the utility is positive, concave and 
increasing in the consumption level. With this utility function poor individuals are risk 
lovers and, for this reason, are more willing to undertake risky activities. 
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  1The empirical relevance of this kind of utility functions (convex below some consumption 
(c) level and concave above c) was noted by Friedman and Savage (1948) and has been 
tested by many authors in the field of experimental economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979; Edwars, 1996; Piron and Smith, 1995 among others). 
 
Using this framework we can improve our understanding of old problems related to 
economic conflicts and illegal crops. In particular, we try to put some light in the 
explanation of the following facts:  
 
1.  In relation to illegal crops:  
•  Plantations of coke, marihuana and poppy are located mainly in poor countries 
(Afghanistan, Bolivia, etc.). 
•  Repressive efforts like fumigations haven’t succeed reducing the planted area (for 
the case of Colombia, see the web page of the Inter-American Drug Abuse 
Commission) 
2.  In relation to economic conflicts: 
•  Persistent and generalized economic conflicts arise only in poor countries (This is 
the case in Africa and some Latin-American countries). 
•  Conflicts may persist even if there are high costs. 
 
The study of these problems is not new in the economic literature. Many papers have been 
done in the field of conflicts and appropriative activities (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993; Grossman, 1991; Grossman, 1994; Brito and Intriligator, 1992; Rodríguez, 1997; 
Skaperdas, 1992; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997; and Zuleta, 2004 among others) but 
never relating poverty and illegal business trough the willingness to undertake risky 
activities. In the same way, the supply-side of Illicit Drugs has been deeply studied 
(Whynes, 1991;  Flower, 1996; Burrus. 1999; Cussen and Block, 2000; Kennally, 2001) but 
not related with poverty and risk-loving behavior. 
 
In the paper at hand we argue that the problems of illegal crops and economic conflicts are 
one result of the risk-loving behavior of the poor agents. 
 
The paper is organized in 5 sections. In the second one the utility function is presented and 
explained. In the third section we analyze the relation between risky business and poverty. In 
  2the fourth section we study the link between poverty and economic conflicts and finally we 
present the conclusions. 
 
2 Utility Function 
 
We consider a subsistence level of income above which utility is concave and 
increasing in consumption and below which - equal to zero. That is: 
d c if U






   (1) 
Where u is utility, c - consumption, d - subsistence level and β  (1>β > 0) indicates how risk 






















Figure 1 represents the utility function from equation 1.  Note that the function is not 
concave for low values of c. Therefore, agents with low income levels may be risk lovers. 
  3To illustrate this point compare any lottery with a positive probability of an income bigger 
than d with a sure income lower or equal to d (even around d): The lottery is preferred. 
 
The dashed line in Figure 1 represents the expected utility of all the lotteries which give with 
some probability the outcome y* and with some probability the outcome zero. The exact 
value of y* can be derived knowing that the slope of the straight line (dashed line) is equal to 
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In general, with this utility function, there exists an income level y*  such that  whenever the 
income of a consumer is below y*, the consumer prefers a lottery which delivers a quantity 
higher than d or zero (both with a positive probability) than the expected value of such 
lottery for sure.  
 
This simple framework helps to understand why poor agents are more willing to work in 
risky activities. Now, since illegal activities are characterized by high risk, ceteris paribus, 
poor agents are more willing to work in illegal activities than rich agents.  
 
3 Risky Business 
 
  4In this section we offer two propositions that help to explain why poor people are willing to 
undertake illegal risky businesses even if the expected value of those business is not very 
high.  
 
3.1 Risky business 
 
Assume that an agent has to choose between two different activities A and 
B. Those activities are described as follows: 
•  A is risk-less and its return is equal or lower than y. 
•  B is risky and its return is yh with probability p and yl with probability (1-p), where 
yh > yl. 
•  y = p(yh) + (1- p)(yl). 
 
Proposition 1: If y < d < yh and p > 0 then the risky option A is preferred. 
 
Proof. The proof is straightforward because U(y) = 0 and U(yh) > 0. 
 
Proposition 2: If the expected outcome of activity A is equal to the expected outcome of 




1.  The expected outcome of activity A is equal to the expected outcome of activity B 
so pyh = y and p = y/ yh 
2.  yl < d so U(yl) = 0 and the expected utility of activity B is given by,  
[]
β β ) ( ) ( ) ( d yh
yh
y
d yh p B U E −   = − =  
3.  The expected utility of activity A is given by, U(A) = (y- d)
β . Since yh > d  and y< 
yh  then 
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From 1, 2 and 3 it follows that E [U(B)] > U(A). 
 
  5These propositions help to understand why illegal crops are grown in poor countries and 
why the efforts of different governments to increase the risk in such activities do not seem to 
reduce the planted area. According to our result there are three ways to curb incentives to 
undertake risky business: 
 
i)  Reduce the probability of success. This policy is often hard to implement. On the 
one hand, the income in case of success may be positively correlated with risk. For 
example, the price of coke goes up after repressive policies. On the other hand, if 
the income derived from the legal activity is close to the subsistence level the only 
way to reduce the incentives is setting the success probability equal to zero (p = 0).  
 
ii)  Reduce the high outcome (yh) of the risky bushiness. If the income derived from 
the legal activity is close to the subsistence level (y ≈ d) any reduction in the high 
outcome of illegal business (yh) would be useless unless the new outcome is equal 
or lower than the outcome of the legal activity (y ≥ yh) . 
 
iii)  Increase the outcome of the risk-less bushiness (y).This type of policy might be 
successful by itself if the new outcome is higher than y but can also be a 
complement to the first two policies. Thus, a successful policy should include not 
only a repressive action against the illegal business but also an effort to increase the 




In this section we address the problem of economic conflicts. We consider an economy with 
two agents (1 and 2) where both of them consume the same good and each have an initial 
endowment. Each agent can consume his (her) endowment or enter into a conflict with the 
other agent. In case of conflict an agent has a positive probability of winning the other 
agent’s endowment and a positive probability of loosing his own.  
 
To analyze the incentives of the agents let us define some concepts: 
e1 : Endowment of agent 1 
e2 : Endowment of agent 2 
ð : Probability of winning for agent one 
  61- ð : Probability of winning for agent two 
Lottery: Game in which agent 1 (agent two) can have an endowment equal to e1+e2 with 
probability ð (1- ð) and an endowment equal to cero with probability 1-ð (ð). 
 
Proposition 3: If the endowments of agents 1 and 2 are such that d <e1+ e2< 2d then for 
any allocation there exist a lottery such that at least one agent is better off  and no one is 
worse off. 
 
Proof. First consider the case without lottery, where each agents consumes his (her) own 
endowment. The utility for agent 1 is given by,  
d c if U and d c if d c U < = ≥ − = 1 0 1 1 ) 1 ( 1
β       (4) 
and the utility for agent 2, 
d c if U and d c if d c U < = ≥ − = 2 0 2 2 ) 2 ( 2
β    (5) 
Since e1 + e2 < 2d then: If e2 > d then e1 < d and if e1 > d then e2 < d.  So either U1 = 0  
or U2 = 0. 
 
Now, consider a lottery such that agent 1 gets e1+e2 (agent 2 gets nothing) with probability 
ð and zero with probability 1-ð (agent 2 gets e1 + e2). The expected utility is given by E 
(U1(L)) = ð (e1 + e2- d)
β and E(U2(L)) = (1- ð) (e1 + e2- d)
β. 
 
Therefore, if e1 > d then U2 = 0 and E(U2(L)) > 0 so agent 2 prefers the lottery and if e2 > 
d then U1 = 0 and E(U1(L)) > 0 so agent 1 prefers the lottery . 
 
Now suppose that e1 > d . For agent 1 the expected utility of the lottery is higher than the 
utility without the lottery if the following inequality holds,  
ð (e1 + e2- d)
 β > (c2 - d)


















, at least one agent is better off with the lottery and no one 
is worse off. 
 

















 at least 
one agent is better off with the lottery and no one is worse off. 
 
 
Proposition 3 tell us that poor agents are willing to take risks for free, that is, without any 
risk premium. For people with a consumption level close to the subsistence level the 
possibility of a higher income is enough to increase his (her) expected utility. 
An economic conflict can be understood as a lottery. Two parties or two agents fight for 
some amount of wealth and for both parties there exists a positive probability to win and a 
positive probability to loose. Therefore, from proposition 3 it follows that for poor agents a 
conflict is a way to increase expected utility. In corollary 4 we explain the relation between 
conflict and poverty in a more formal way. 
 
Corollary 4: If the endowments of agents 1 and 2 are such that d < e1+e2 < 2d and both 
have positive probabilities of winning a conflict then at least one agent has incentives to 
















 for every i, both agents have incentives 
to start the conflict. 
 
We can conclude that a successful policy to prevent economic conflicts should include not 
only a repressive action but also an effort to increase the income of the population and, in 
particular, the income of the poorest agents. 
 
An important implication of corollary 4 is that if the income of the economy is very low any 
effort to redistribute is useless and the only way to avoid conflicts is increasing the income 
of the economy as a whole. Notice that in proposition 3 and corollary 4 we have assumed 
that conflicts are costless. However, conflicts demand resources that could be used in the 
production of goods. The existence of such costs may eliminate the incentives for economic 
conflicts. 
 
Proposition 5:  If the endowments of agents 1 and 2 are such that d<e1+e2, e1<d and the 
cost of a conflict (x) is lower than the difference between the endowment of the economy and 
  8the subsistence level, that is, if x<e1+e2-d then the cost cannot prevent the agents for going 
into a conflict. 
 
Proof.  If  x < e1 + e2 - d  then  e1+e2-(x+d)>0  so  ð(e1+e2-(x + d))
 β > 0.  So for the 
poorest agent the expected utility under conflict is higher than the expected utility in peace. 
 
From proposition 5, given the income of the poorest agent, the possibility of an economic 
conflict depends on two variables: the cost of the conflict and the income of the richer agent. 
In other words, inequality may play an important roll in the configuration of an economic 
conflict. Therefore, re-distributive policies can be useful to avoid economic conflicts. 
However, if the conflictive society is too poor, it is impossible to eliminate economic 




We consider a utility function such that when the consumption lies below a subsistence level 
the utility is zero and when the consumption lies above the subsistence level the utility is 
positive, concave and increasing in the consumption level. With this utility function poor 
individuals are risk lovers and, for this reason, are more willing to undertake risky activities. 
Since poor agents are risk lovers and illegal activities are characterized by high risk, ceteris 
paribus, poor agents are more disposed to work in illegal activities than rich agents. 
 
Using this framework we can extract some policy implications: A successful strategy against 
illegal activities should include not only a repressive action but also an effort to increase the 
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